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RIGHTS OF EXIT
Leslie Green
York University, Toronto
I. LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT

Social groups claim authority to impose restrictions on their members that
the state cannot. Churches, ethnic groups, minority nations, universities,
social clubs, and families all regulate belief and behavior in ways that would
be obviously unjust in the context of a state and its citizens. All religions
impose doctrinal requirements; many also enforce sexist practices and
customs. Some universities impose stringent speech and conduct codes on
their students and faculty. Parochial schools discriminate in their hiring
practices. Those who complain about such internal restrictions on the
liberties of members might well be told to "love it or leave it."
Such terms of association would be extortionate if applied to a whole
political society. A violation of civil liberties does not become tolerable just
because citizens may emigrate, although it is true that, if they may not, then
things are even worse. A state that compels religious orthodoxy is unjust
even if there are freer countries nearby to which one might go. A state that
practices racial or sexual discrimination is unjust even if things are fine
across an open border. We do not in these cases think it proper to require
people to love it or leave it. On the contrary, in this context the slogan is
recognized as a crude bid to retain power and restrict dissent. It does not
require an exorbitant commitment to liberty to reject this, and to insist that
citizens are entitled to their rights here and now. They have the right to
remain while seeking to reform, to protest, and sometimes even to disobey
and revolt. When things are dire, they may appeal to others for help, and
in sufficiently serious cases outsiders may intervene without even being
asked. In a free and democratic society, the basic liberties are to be respected, and the right to emigrate is no compensation if they are not.
Why then should smaller social groups be any different? Here, even
liberals are inclined to admit that people should, in effect, either love the
groups of which they are members or leave them. For example, John Rawls
suggests that "particular associations may be freely organized as their members wish, and they may have their own internal life and discipline subject
I am grateful to audiences at the Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, and at the departments of
philosophy at the universities of Guelph and Lethbridge for valuable discussion of earlier
versions of this paper; and especially to Meni Mautner, Alex Smith, and the referees for this
journal for their helpful criticisms.
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to the restriction that their members have a real choice of whether to
continue their affiliation."1 This may seem obvious. If associations are
indeed organized "as their members wish" then how can there be any
further question about the proper scope of their authority over those
members? Indeed, why even require that the members have a "real choice"
about whether to remain in the group? Chandran Kukathas suggests that
"Cultural communities should . . . be looked on this way: as associations of
individuals whose freedom to live according to communal practices each
finds acceptable is of fundamental importance."2 However, the test of acceptability to each is extraordinarily exigent. Most cultural communities seek
to impose an internal discipline on their members without regard to
whether it is approved by each and every one.
The right of exit would be otiose if each member enjoyed a veto against
the group. But that strikes squarely at the source of the problem. Few if any
of the familiar social groups give individual members a veto over their
ways—perhaps no group of any scope or significance could even survive on
those terms. No doubt this is why Kukathas is tempted to relax the test and
require only acceptability to a majority of the group. "The practices of
communities of individuals, the majority of whom accept the legitimacy of
the association, must... be accepted, the views of dissidents notwithstanding."3 This suggests something rather different: a two-stage process according to which the rights of individuals within the group are determined by
communal practice while the legitimacy of communal practice is determined by majority rule. This is a pleasantly democratic view of things. Few
social groups or cultural communities operate according to majority rule.
Universities, churches, professional associations all typically claim legitimacy on other grounds.
So the problem is this: What we call "the wishes of the members" may at
best amount to no more than the wishes of a majority of members, or, more
typically, even just the wishes of the most powerful members, or the oldest
members, that is to say, the wishes of a subgroup sanctioned by some
familiar basis of social authority as having the right to speak for the whole.
That reality helps explain why there must be what Rawls calls a real choice
of whether to continue affiliation. In that context, the right of exit is a
promise to internal dissidents that even if the majority, the priests, or the
elders can dictate the terms, they cannot compel membership.
That much is not terribly controversial, at least in broad outline. The
hard question is whether such a right of exit is enough to protect internal
dissidents. For it is also part of the common view that, subject to respecting
a right of exit, the groups are entitled to sovereignty over their members.
Those who don't like it are free to leave, much in the way a consumer can
1. John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212 (1971)
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3. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
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leave the market for a product that he or she finds too high in price or too
low in quality. Thus, within voluntary social groups, rights of exit are held
to be an adequate substitute for the basic liberties.
In this article I test and reject that idea. I argue that insofar as individual
autonomy is the value that grounds rights of exit, this very same consideration also grounds a family of related rights, and thus social groups do not
in justice enjoy unlimited sovereignty over their members, not even when
the members are perfectly free to leave. Hence, the familiar contrast between the liberties appropriate under a democratic government and those
appropriate in special social groups is exaggerated. This has, as we shall see,
some important implications for the possibility and value of some forms of
communitarian and identity politics.
II. FREE A N D PURPOSIVE ASSOCIATIONS

The familiar view just sketched depends on a dual contrast between social
groups and the state. Social groups are said to be both free and purposive
institutions, whereas the state is neither. The state is a realm of compulsion,
not freedom, and there are no overarching purposes that its subjects can be
assumed to have in common. This twofold difference gives political organizations wider duties than particular social groups. Because exit from the
state is not realistically possible, and because the state may not assume a
unity of moral purpose, it must respect the basic liberties of freedom of
association, participation, conscience, nondiscrimination, and so on. The
absence of those background conditions gives social groups freer reign over
their own members.
One influential statement of this idea appears in Locke's Letter Concerning
Toleration. His argument about the proper relations between states and
churches turns on what he takes to be the essential nature and functions of
each. Locke defines a church as "a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the publick worshipping of
God, in such a manner as theyjudge acceptable to him, and effectual to the
salvation of their souls."4 The fact that it is a voluntary society means both
that "No body is born a member of any Church" and that it should remain
"as free for him to go out as it were to enter."5 Locke held that no one is
born subject to a government, and that legitimate political power depends
on consent and on the government respecting the terms for which political
power has been entrusted to it. However, even if this is the ultimate foundation of political legitimacy, government retains the power of ultimate
coercive force—and that force is, Locke thinks, inappropriate and even
irrational in matters of doctrine. Sincere belief cannot be compelled, so the
4. John Locke, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28 (J.H. Tully ed., 1983).
5. Id.
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internal ways of churches must be tolerated, provided they do not t r e s p a s s
on the proper realm of governments.
Thus, social groups are voluntary associations in a way that the state is
not; it exercises compulsory jurisdiction over everyone within its territory,
whether they are citizens, resident aliens, refugees, or tourists. When t h e r e
are open borders and a right of emigration people may leave, but t h i s
choice is itself regulated by the state and, typically, subject to many c o n d i tions, some of them restrictive. Moreover, apart from these legalities, it is i n
social and economic terms enormously difficult for most people to u p r o o t
and emigrate, and they do so only to enter the jurisdiction of another state.
And, above all, the authority of the state claims to be both comprehensive
and supreme: It claims power to regulate a wide range of human behavior,
and to decide whether any other social authorities are to be tolerated. Rawls
concludes from this that fundamental differences exist between states a n d
subordinate social groups:
In a democratic society nonpublic power, as seen, for example, in the authority of churches over their members, is freely accepted. In the case of ecclesiastical power, since apostasy and heresy are not legal offenses, those who are
no longer able to recognize a church's authority may cease being members
without running afoul of state power. . . . By contrast, the government's
authority cannot be evaded except by leaving the territory over which it
governs, and not always t h e n . . . . The government's authority cannot, then,
be freely accepted in the sense that the bonds of society and culture, of
history and social place of origin, begin so early to shape our life and are
normally so strong that the right of emigration (suitably qualified) does not
suffice to make accepting its authority free, politically speaking, in the way
that liberty of conscience suffices to make accepting ecclesiastical authority
free, politically speaking.6
Social groups are thus free associations from the political point of view. N o
one is legally or politically compelled to be a member of any of them. If
membership brings limitations on belief and behavior, if it subjects adherents to practices that would otherwise be discriminatory, unjust, or foolish,
then these disadvantages nonetheless flow from a free decision to belong,
and any of them can be evaded by leaving the group.
Let us turn now to the second contrast. Social groups form the middlerange of political life within which people pursue common goals; these are
purposive associations. Culture, nation, religion, family, profession, avocation—these are the things that make most people's lives valuable. To a
greater or lesser degree, these associations embody the shared values and
commitments of their members. Though free, social groups are not anarchic. As Locke observed, "Forasmuch as no Society, how free soever, or
upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted . . . but will presently dissolve
6. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 221-22 (1993).
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and break to pieces, unless it be regulated by some Laws, and the Members
all consent to observe some Order, Place, and time must be agreed on; rules
for admitting and excluding Members must be establisht... ."7
The precise content of these laws will depend on the degree and nature
of consensus within the group. Because experiments in living are normally
joint ventures, human freedom requires the power to associate with the
like-minded. This is quite different from the normal situation in the modern state. It is not that the state has no point, just that its point cannot be
characterized by a shared purpose in life, except at a level so abstract and
general that it could resolve no disagreement about what is to be done. On
the contrary, it is assumed that the liberal state will need to be able to rule
citizens whose views about the fundamental purposes of life diverge: They
may serve God or Mammon; they may make submarines or sonnets. Particular social groups can take for granted a certain amount of common ground,
and on that agreed basis impose restrictions of their members. The state
cannot, or at any rate should not.
Hence, social groups may enjoy substantial degree of autonomy in their
internal constitutions in order to channel the energies of their members
toward these shared ends. As Rawls notes, Tor churches and universities
different principles are plainly more suitable. Their members usually affirm
certain shared purposes as essential guidelines to the most appropriate
form of organization."8 A university, for instance, need not aim to satisfy
principles of distributive justice—we need not teach so as to give the greatest benefit to the worst-off students. A religion may reject freedom of
conscience, or equality of the sexes. A minority linguistic group may suppress competitor languages. The uniformity of purpose and direction
makes these practices not only predictable, but morally acceptable. The
kind of pluralism that is thought to warrant toleration and restraint in the
context of a whole political society is attenuated in smaller social groups. A
whole society contains different religions that must somehow find a way to
coexist; that is the social background to freedom of conscience. These
differences are effaced in a single church. Thus, while fundamental principles of justice will structure the environment in which a church exists—it
may not count on laws against apostasy to secure its membership, it may not
be supported by the public purse, and so on—those principles will not
directly regulate its internal constitution. The more agreement in the basic
framework of values, the less needed are the restraints of tolerance and the
framework of the basic liberties. Bear in mind that the conclusion is that
they are less needed and not that they are unneeded. Rawls says that "different
principles" of social organization are more suitable to particular groups, not
that there are no relevant principles of internal justice. Nonetheless, the

7. Locke, supra note 4, at 28.
8. Rawls, supra note 6, at 261.
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general idea is that social groups should have in these respects much more
latitude than the state.
This conclusion is congenial to one popular view about the conditions for
social and cultural diversity. If we are to celebrate and sustain difference, if
we value multiculturalism in a cosmopolitan world, then we will need to
have the political space where such difference can prosper. A cosmopolitan
world may, at the century's end, be our historical fate; but if real diversity is
to flourish, we need a social union of social unions that are not themselves
cosmopolitan, that embody and defend their distinctive ideals and purposes, even when that requires restrictions on the rights of their members.
We need mosaics, not melting pots.
III. ENTRY AND EXIT

The view just described holds that, as free and purposive associations,
particular social groups are entided to wider control over their members
provided always that they respect their rights of exit. Clearly, if people were
compelled to belong to a group, then we would be less likely to exempt it
from the obligation to respect the ordinary principles of political morality.
The right to exit is obviously playing a critical role in this reasoning; we
need to explore it in more detail.
It is often supposed, especially by those who have in mind the model of
a perfecdy competitive market, that exit is an unproblematic concept.
Albert Hirschman, for example, believes that what he calls "voice"—remaining within a group and striving for change—is a more difficult concept,
because trying to change a state of affairs is more complex and difficult
than merely leaving it.9 Voice is a matter of strategy and gradation; exit is a
one-off, either-or decision. In fact, however, things are not this simple. The
spatial metaphor of an exit has clearest application to territorially bounded
groups. To exit the state is to leave its territory and (excepting cases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction) when one permanently crosses the border, that
is it. But what does it mean to leave a religion or a nation—to say nothing
of an ethnic group or a sexual orientation? In these cases, too, we find
kinds, or at least degrees, of belonging and alienation.
Many ways in which one can cease to be a member of a social group do
not involve freely leaving. For example, a group may dissolve or disband,
thus one will cease to owe it any obligations, and one's moral position will
presumably revert to the status quo ante. (This was an important part of
Locke's doctrine of revolution: In some circumstances political society may
dissolve, freeing people from their obligations of obedience.) Alternatively,
members may be ostracized or expelled for refusing to comply with a
group s norms. Neither of these are what the above account has in mind by
9. Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT V m r t n
TIONS AND STATES 115-16,
5 - 1 6 30 S
ZATIONS,
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the notion of exit. The fact that a group is liable to dissolve does nothing
to lessen the burden of internal restrictions while it still exists, and the scope
of a group's authority to expel members is itself one of the internal restrictions whose status we need to justify.
The relevant sense of exit is that of voluntarily leaving the effective
jurisdiction of the group. In the case of groups with a territorial jurisdiction,
that means leaving the territory. A group's jurisdiction is given by the scope
of the norms that regulate the belief or behavior of its members. What it
purports to regulate, and what it in fact does regulate, may, of course, vary,
as may the effectiveness of its norms. The Roman Catholic Church, for
example, purports to prohibit sex outside marriage and birth control within
it; but it notoriously fails in this, for adherents widely ignore the prescribed
sexual morality. On the other hand, in Italy, Spain, and Quebec the Church
used to direct the political loyalties of its members although it did not
officially purport to do so. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that people
must be free to leave not only the dejure but also the de facto jurisdiction of
a group.
What is the point of exit? First and most obviously, it has a protective
function. If the group harms the interests of the member as the member
sees them, then leaving is a form of self-defense. Of course, it would be
wrong to suppose that the protective function is effective only when exit is
actually exercised. The possibility of exit may itself make the group responsive to the interests of its members. Second, exit may also have an expressive
function, for it is commonly held that leaving is in a way to criticize the
group, while remaining is to support it. This point is often exaggerated and
misunderstood. Beginning with Plato, many have taken the refusal to leave
as an expression of an agreement to obey. In the Crito, Plato has the Laws
say to Socrates:
[W]e . . . declare, by the fact of granting the privilege to any Athenian who
wishes it, when he comes of age and sees how things are in the city, and sees
us the laws, that anybody who is not satisfied with us is permitted to take what
belongs to him and to emigrate to wherever he pleases. And not one of us
laws stands in the way or forbids it... .10
The Laws claim that not only did Socrates not emigrate, but that he rarely
traveled abroad, willingly raised his children there, and even preferred
death to exile. On this basis, they conclude that Socrates has "given this
agreement to them more emphatically than almost any other Athenian."11
This idea was taken up by Locke and other consent theorists, who,
finding no explicit agreements to obey the law, inferred from a failure to
leave either a tacit agreement or an obligation of equivalent force and
10.

Plato, Crito, 51d in LAW AND OBEDIENCE: THE ARGUMENTS OF PLATO'S CRITO 152 (A.D.

Woozley trans., Duckworth 1979).
11. 7<f. 52a at 153.
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effect. However, it is unlikely that refusal to leave can normally be taken as
any kind of agreement to obey. Voluntary obligations are belief-dependent: •
No one agrees unless he believes that he does. But most people do n o t '
believe that failure to exit means that they have agreed to obey. Moreover,
the option of remaining must be a reasonable one, and as Hume noted, the
vast majority of people simply have no choice but to stay out: The costs of
uprooting are usually insurmountable and, often enough, no other state
will take them in. Is the idea of grounding the authority of groups in tacit
consent any more plausible here than it is in the case of political obligation?
It is as difficult to leave many social groups as it is to leave the state, and in
some cases it is even impossible. Consider, to begin, that exit from many
groups involves taking along a lot of baggage. There are, in the first place,
the ordinary consequences of socialization. Those groups that are most
important in human life are precisely those in which the mechanical notions
of "entry" and "exit" seem less helpful in understanding how people come to
be members than do the organic notions of growth and development. For
example, save for adult converts, most religious people inherit their faith.
Now, Locke insists that "No body is born a member of any Church,"12 but in
one straightforward sense, that is precisely what they are. They grow up in a
family or school with religious outlooks and values that they internalize and
adapt. This produces a whole set of profound effects, including—sometimes—the feeling that one is so intimately bound up with the fate of one's
religion that it is almost a part of one's personal identity. Abandoning this is
so unlike the process of entering or leaving the market for a car or a health
club that any similarities seem overwhelmed by the differences.
Locke held that only mature individual reflection and acceptance could
bring a person within the authority of a church. Nevertheless, the circumstances of birth, family, and community may make for more or less propitious circumstances for that reflection. Locke's highly individualistic,
Protestant view about the free acceptance of faith needs to be set against
the trite but important fact that the vast majority of religious people end up
accepting what they were raised to believe. Surely this convergence of
judgment is better explained by the constitutive power of early socialization
than it is by the coincidence of people having reasoned their way to identical conclusions. Indeed, such are the normal processes of training that it
may even be difficult for members to get an adequate perspective on the
groups that contributed to their formation. Even to contemplate leaving
requires enough cognitive and emotional distance to understand and envision a new future. Achieving that is a great challenge and it explains why
rejecting one's family of origin, abandoning one's religion, or coming out
of the closet are typically wrenching and life-transforming experiences.
It is interesting that this truth is rarely disputed when it comes to the
question of political membership. As Rawls says in the passage quoted
12. Locke, supra note 4, at 28.
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above 13 the bonds of society, culture, history, and place of origin are so firm
that enjoying a right to emigrate still does not make accepting the authority
of the state a free act. Why then is the bare existence of legal freedom of
conscience sufficient to make accepting ecclesiastical authority free? It is
true that Rawls claims only that it is free "from the political point of view,"
meaning that we have no civic obligation to a particular faith. But does that
suffice to make the acceptance of ecclesiastical authority sufficiently free to
require no limits beyond therightto exit in the way that Kukathas, for example,

suggests? We need not adopt the unacceptable thesis that socialization turns
people into zombies, unable to assess their options and thus unfree. It is a
major (if still unfulfilled) task of social theory to explain the circumstances
in which socialization does render people unfree, and those in which it does
not. Fortunately, that is not the question we face here.14 We are not asking
the absolute question, "Are these people unfree?" but only the comparative
question, "Are they routinely more free than they are in the state?" On the
relevant point of comparison, we must conclude that the two cases are more
similar than first appears, for the bonds that Rawls refers to are no less tight
in the case of particular social groups, and often more so. It is not uncommon for people to feel a closer bond to their churches, families, and ethnic
groups than they do to the larger and more anonymous political union in
which they find themselves.
In some cases, the lack of freedom is practically identical, and here I
come to the second point. The incidents of group membership are sometimes ascriptive. In these respects, to be a member is simply to be taken
for a member. This is not, or not entirely, a function of one's own will.
This is of particular significance in the case of groups that are stigmatized
or oppressed. Jean-Paul Sartre famously argued that Jewishness is not a
function of shared religion, history, ethnicity, or values, but simply shared
oppression: "The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew . . . it is the
anti-semite that makes the Jew,"15 he wrote. This may be exaggeration, but
it is true that secular Jews in Europe routinely found that their attempts
to exit their religion were regarded as irrelevant by Nazis and their collaborators. And in many countries race is ascribed to people in ways that
may be largely independent of their ancestry. In the United States, for
instance, blacks are all those who are so regarded by whites: Thus the
notorious "one drop rule" according to which any degree of African ancestry makes one black. This is not to deny that ascriptive identities often
come to have a life of their own and that people may, for a variety of
reasons, willingly embrace and elaborate the identities with which others
13. Rawls, supra note 6.
14. Kukathas misunderstands this point Of course it is true that one may freely assume
substantial risks. But the relevant question is whether the risks of exiting social groups are so
much less than the risk of leaving one's state as to obviate the need for rights apart from exit.
See Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka, 20 POLITICAL THEORY

674-80 (1992).
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW 69 (GJ. Becker trans., Schocken Books 1965).
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have saddled them. However, it does show the limits of individual will i n
attempting to leave such groups.
Now, the fact that one cannot shed an ascriptive identity does not by itself,
establish that one cannot escape the jurisdiction of a group whose identity
it is. That depends on who is doing the ascribing. A Jew can leave t h e
congregation even if he cannot shed his identity as a Jew. On the o t h e r
hand, there are situations in which the group itself does the ascribing a n d
makes that the condition of membership. Consider, for example, the Canadian case of Thomas v. Norris.l& Thomas was an Indian who had lived off t h e
reserve most of his life, was not raised in the traditional culture or religion
of the band, knew little of it, and explicitly rejected what he knew. Nonetheless, he was subjected to certain rituals in the course of which he was ;
assaulted, battered, and forcibly confined. His Indian captors did not accept
that he had validly exercised any powers of exit, and claimed him as one of
their own and subject to their collective aboriginal right to maintain their
ways. (The court did not agree, and Thomas's tort action was successful.)
In such cases, it is not clear how the right to exit might even be exercised.
Let us take stock. First, exit is itself a complex notion. Second, the sort of
considerations that show that accepting political authority may be unfree
notwithstanding a right to emigrate also establish that accepting membership in social groups may also be unfree, notwithstanding the existence of
a right of exit. That the acceptance of ecclesiastical authority is free from
the political point of view may therefore be of no more significance than
the fact that the acceptance of political authority is free from, say, the Taoist
point of view. The individual's actual capacity to escape either may be
limited by the same sort of personal and economic considerations, and, in
cases of ascriptive membership, it may simply be impossible. All of this
strongly suggests that the sharp distinction that is commonly drawn between
the state and smaller social groups cannot be sustained.
IV. AUTONOMY AND EXIT

What then is the relationship between the right of exit and the internal
constitution of groups? According to Kukathas, the only fundamental right
is that of freedom of association: Provided exit is guaranteed, cultural
communities should be free to do with their members as they wish. Our
respect for their policies is owed not, as some of their defenders suppose,
to minority cultures in their own right nor even as a collective good for
their members, but only to the associative (and dissociative) choices of
individuals:
Cultural communities may be regarded as voluntary associations to the extent
mat members recognize as legitimate the terms of association and the author16. Thomas v. Norris [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 139.
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ity that upholds them. All that is necessary as evidence of such recognition is
the fact that members choose not to leave. Recognition in these austere terms
would, of course, be meaningless without the individual having one important right against the community: the right to be free to leave. That has to be
the individual's fundamental right; it is also his only fundamental right, all
other rights being either derivative of this right, or rights granted by the
community.17

He adds that "the primacy of freedom of association is all-important; it has
to take priority over other liberties—such as those of speech or worship—which lie at the core of the liberal tradition."18 Allowing, as we
should, that the rights of exit are necessary, is it correct to suppose that they
exhaust the fundamental rights of individuals against groups?
There are three powerful reasons to doubt this. First, as I have argued in
the previous section, the bare existence of a right of exit does not establish
that particular groups are free associations. The exit model is too much in
the grip of an economic view of human nature, according to which well-informed consumers enter and leave the market with low transaction costs.
But the forms of group life that matter most to us are not at all like that:
Group membership has noninstrumental value, entry is automatic or even
ascriptive, the groups structure whole lives, and the transaction costs of
change are huge. The notion that the dissatisfied might simply leave is, in
such circumstances, fatuous.
There is a second reason to doubt the supremacy and sufficiency of
associative freedom. The argument depends on the supposition that if
cultural communities were free in the relevant sense, then their norms
would necessarily command respect or tolerance because of the respect due
to agreements or choices. However, it is not plausible to suppose that
agreement has unlimited power. Agreements create, vary, and extinguish
rights and duties only because there are good reasons to endorse the
power-conferring rule that they may do so. But the underlying reasons do
not go so far as to validate every purported exercise of the power in question.
Consider, for example, the rule that confers the power to make ordinary
contracts. This is a desirable rule for a number of reasons—it allows us to
make mutually profitable deals, to commit ourselves to future plans, to
establish new relationships, and so on. But an ordinary contract has limits
to its validity. Slavery contracts are void ab initio. In many jurisdictions a
trade union and an employer cannot make a collective agreement that
permits discrimination against employees on grounds of race, religion, sex,
nationality, and so on. Locke conceded, surprisingly for his time, that there
is a right to exit from marriage, at least where it is not prohibited by civil
law. Yet he also denied that the marriage contract could ever give husbands
despotic power over their wives: The considerations that ground the right
17. Kukathas, supra note 2, at 238.
18. Id. at 248.
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to divorce also ground rights to fair treatment during the duration of the
marriage.19 These examples all illustrate the typical limits to the scope of
our normative powers. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that even
willingly created associations have unlimited authority over their members,
and that in turn suggests that at least some other rights are as fundamental
as the right of exit.
The third reason for doubting the thesis flows from the nature of exit
rights themselves. What is the justification for requiring groups to respect a
right of exit? It may enhance social stability and perhaps utility by ensuring
that only those who are committed to the ways of the group remain. Neither
of these, however, would warrant imposing exit as a necessary condition of
the authority of groups, since either of them might be qualified in any
number of circumstances. Is it to secure the value of tolerance? That
depends on what we have in mind by that ideal. As Will Kymlicka argues,
the millet system of the Ottoman empire expressed a kind of tolerance, for
it was a federation of self-governing theocracies some of which rigorously
crushed heresy and apostasy within while not interfering with the regimes
in other millets.20 Although the system was fairly stable and offered a modus
vivendi among Jewish, Christian, and Muslim subjects it was a "deeply conservative and patriarchal society, antithetical to the ideals of personal liberty.''21 Now, when Kukathas identifies the central value underlying rights
of exit, he puts it this way: "No one can be required to accept a particular way
of life."22 But that ideal was not honored in the millet system, for although
the Ottoman empire did not require its subjects to adopt a particular
religion, some of the millets did. Even where apostasy was not a crime, there
were severe internal restrictions on basic liberties. These people were required to accept a particular way of life, by their own communities, which
enjoyed the tolerance and even support of the empire. Thus, it does not
seem that tolerance is the key either.
Underneath the idea that no one can be required to accept a particular
way of life lies, I think, the familiar notion of personal autonomy. The
fundamental reason for thinking exit necessary is to fulfil the protective and
expressive functions that enhance the capacity for a self-directed life, including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends. Exit is necessary,
not for stability, utility, or even tolerance, but to secure individual autonomy. The interest in self-direction is so important and central that it warrants holding others duty-bound to respect it. That is the ground of exit
rights. This is, of course, a judgment of political morality and not yet a
prescription for institutional design. Whether such rights ought to be pro19. John Locke, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, ss.80-83 (P. Laslett ed., 1988). Locke's
view ot what fair treatment actually amounted to was, however, marred by the sexist assumpr
tions of his time.
20. Will Kymlicka, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 155-58 (1995).
1
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tected by law—to say nothing of constitutional law—is a separate question
entirely.
If that is correct, however, it also follows that the right of exit is an
insufficient safeguard for justice within groups. First, there are conditions
necessary for the right of exit to be effective, and these generate further
rights. Second, the value of individual autonomy that underlies the right to
exit is itself powerful enough to generate other rights independently of any
instrumental connection with exit. The following rights can, I think, all be
established in the following ways.
A. Freedom of Dissociation

This is the claim right that others not prevent one from leaving the jurisdiction of the group. It is the core right of exit. Because people may be
prevented in a variety of ways from leaving, this will in turn give rise to a
variety of further rights. For example, as Kukathas himself acknowledges,
it follows that cultural communities must respect rights against enslavement and some forms of physical coercion.23 Nor can apostasy be made a
crime.
B. Right to Mobility

To leave the jurisdiction of a territorial group one must be able to cross its
borders. But to reach the border one must be allowed to get there, so one
must be entitled to move around with some degree of freedom within the
group and, finally, out of it. Thus, groups cannot seek to restrict mobility in
ways that would effectively hold people captive. The Taliban militia were
therefore wrong to prevent women from driving cars; the Soviet Union was
wrong to withhold identification papers necessary for travel, and so on. In
the case of territorial groups, people may also have a right to adequate
identification papers to allow them to travel.
C. Freedom of Expression

Before one can leave one must know where one can go, how to get there,
and how to get out. The need for this information generates a right to (at
least limited) freedom of expression grounded both in the interests of the
audience in having the information, and in the interests of the speaker in
being able to provide it. Yet many minority groups, especially religions, seek
to restrict the sort of information their members receive about the world.
23. Id. at 249-50. Kukathas also claims that would be bound by liberal prohibitions on
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," though this seems unmotivated in view of his
argument strategy.
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In the American case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, for instance, the Amish defended
their practice of removing their children from school before the prescribed
age of 16, precisely in order to protect their community from the solvent of
public education.24 And information about the outside world is not the only
thing that people may need. There is normally a good deal of dispute zvithin
groups not only about how their purposes are to be pursued, but also a b o u t
what they in fact are.25 The decision about whether to stay or leave involves
an assessment of where the group itself is going, and that requires freedom
of expression about internal practices.
D. Freedom of Association

The right of exit is also incomplete without freedom of (internal) association allowing people to be able to get the information and make t h e
preparations in order to leave. Moreover, even if the decision to leave is o n e
that must be taken as an individual, it need not be a decision to leave alone.
Locke held that a tacit consenter "is at liberty to go and incorporate himself
into any other Commonwealth, or to agree with others to begin a new one." 2 6
Kukathas appears to accept this. He notes that "individuals within t h e
cultural community are free to leave together or in association with others a n d
to reconstitute the community under modified terms of association."27 In
most cases people will want to leave with their families intact, and many
religious groups collectively flee oppression (e.g., the Puritans, Doukhobors, Mennonites, etc.).
E. Fair Share of Common Resources

People may be prevented from leaving without being forbidden to leave.
For example, they may be unjustly deprived of the necessary resources, a n d
this too violates their rights of exit. This is not to say that a church, family,
or university must enforce for itself the same principles of distributive
justice that are appropriate to a whole society. Rather, it is that it must
respect principles of justice in dissolution, conditioned by the legitimate
expectations of the members. If there are exit taxes, these must not be
punitive. What may be taken on departure will depend on the nature of the
goods in question and the understandings of the community. The Laws say
to Socrates that he can take whatever belongs to him, but Locke's tacit
consenter has to give up, by sale if he can, but apparently without compen24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
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sation if he cannot, his rights in land.28 The issue is most difficult in the case
of those who leave communal arrangements to which they contributed part
of the joint product. It may often be that the product (arable land, buildings, etc.) is indivisible or immovable, and it may be difficult to apportion
a proper share to each; but that need not preclude some form of compensation.29
I believe it plausible that rights to dissociate, to mobility, to free expression, to freedom of association, and to a fair share of common resources
required by any conception of the right to exit are at least necessary to
relieve the burden of internal restrictions. Perhaps there are other rights,
too. The general point is this: The character and generality of the interest
in autonomy means that the duties it is capable of generating cannot be
confined to the right of exit.
Interestingly, there are some suggestions that Locke would have been
more friendly to this conclusion than are some contemporary liberals.
Locke denies that even free and purposive institutions can legitimately hold
absolute authority over their members. Their power is limited: They may
enforce those rules that are both necessary to the society and established
by "common consent," and they may expel those who refuse to conform.
But even this power is hedged: a[N]o Church is bound by the Duty of
Toleration to retain any such person in her Bosom, as, after Admonition,
continues obstinately to offend against the laws of the Society."30 Locke
insists, however, that the power of excommunication can extend no further
than to dissolve the bond between member and society, and that it can
attach no further adverse consequences to his departure: "[Nevertheless,
in all such Cases care is to be taken that the Sentence of Excommunication,
and the Execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage, of Word or Action,
whereby the ejected person may any wise be damnified in Body or Estate.
For all force . . . belongs only to the Magistrate."31 So what Locke calls the
"fundamental and immutable Right of a spontaneous Society, that has
power to remove any of its Members who transgress the Rule of its Institution" is itself subject to stringent limitations:32 People are entitled to fair
notice, reasonable treatment, and to security of their property and person.
It may be said that the exit argument seeks to win only tolerance, and not
28. Those whose consent is, in Locke's terms, tacit are bound to obey die law only as long
as their enjoyment of its benefits continues. (Express consenters are "perpetually and indispensably" obliged till the government dissolves.) They may, if they are landowners, take the land
with any conditions that the donor assigned to it, but the direct jurisdiction of the government
is only over the land, and if they give it up, one "is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into
any other Commonwealth, or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis.. .."
Locke, supra note 19, II, s.121, at 349.
29. Cf. Hofer v. Hofer et al. [1970] 13 D.L.R. (3d) 1. In this case, two Hutterites who were
expelled from the colony sued for a share of the communal assets. The Supreme Court of
Canada refused their claim, upholding religious autonomy of the group.
30. Locke, supra note 4, at 30.
31. Id. at 30-31.
32. 7d.at31.
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validity, for the norms of groups; that is, it gives nonmembers a reason to
restrain their hostile responses to internal restrictions, but it gives no one a
reason to endorse those restrictions. John Stuart Mill believed something
like that about Mormon women in polygamous marriages. He held that
although the system violated their rights by allowing a double standard for
women and men, it was voluntary on the part of the women. So long as
Mormons "allow perfect freedom of departure for those who are dissatisfied
with their ways," Mill maintained that they should be tolerated in the sense
that outsiders may not try to put that practice "to an end."33 By the same
token, outsiders have no obligation to recognize the validity of Mormon
marriages. As I have argued elsewhere, however, this is tolerance in an
especially narrow sense.34 It is true that one way to tolerate a practice is to
refrain from eliminating it. Yet groups seeking tolerance typically want, and
are offered, more than that. Tolerance is normally thought to include also:
acknowledging their authority over those who endorse it, not seeking to
undermine that authority, and sometimes even protecting it from the intervention of others. One may do all these things without endorsing the
practice at all and, indeed, while remaining critical of it. If one understands
tolerance merely as the refusal to eliminate a practice, then it might seem
that the right to exit pre-empts any other rights of those subject to it—if
their decision to remain undercuts a case for eliminating the practice, then
it justifies tolerance in the narrow sense. But it does not justify tolerance in
any broader sense: The right of exit does not show that polygamy should be
recognized, not undermined, or protected.
Hence, certain internal restrictions must be regarded as illegitimate by
anyone who endorses the right of exit. And we must therefore reject the
view that this right has any special priority over other familiar civil rights.
Exit rights are based on a fundamental interest in individual autonomy.
That interest both on its own and through various instrumental connections with exit yields a cluster of related rights, all of which are to be
respected as much by social groups as by the state.
V. WHO IS TO DECIDE?

This is a significant conclusion; it is also an exceedingly abstract one. Who
is to decide what exit and its related rights actually require in particular
circumstances? And won't this inevitably lead us down the path of interference with special groups, ultimately defeating the whole point of associative
freedom?
There are two distinct issues here: a question ofjudgment, and a question
of authority. In the first place, we have to draw concrete, conclusive judg2 ' \i'J£lr ^ UlT^ in UTIUTARIANISM 224 (M. Warnock ed.. 1962).
265-67 (Will i S t a S ^ w ^ 8 and TheirRiShts, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES
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merits from abstract, prima facie rights. That is a major problem of moral
and political philosophy. To say that rights of exit are necessary is not to say
that those rights are absolute. A right may be a necessary feature of some
regime, and yet liable to be qualified by conflicting rights. This need not
mean that the right to exit ever drops out, though in some cases its force
may be shown only indirectly—for example, by mandating compensation
for those who cannot leave, or who cannot leave on the preferred terms. It
may even be that in exceptional cases, members of groups may be temporarily conscripted to remain when, for instance, there would be catastrophic
costs for third parties in allowing them to leave now rather than later. The
position here is no different from other cases of conflicting moral rights.
The second issue is the one of authority. It is important to notice that this
arises not only when we recognize the other internal rights of members but
also with the right of exit itself. For who is to decide when the right of exit
has been validly exercised? As Thomas v. Norris demonstrates, it may be
hazardous to leave that up to the group itself. And when we concede that
the right of exit is insufficient to secure the sort of autonomy that is at stake,
the problem ramifies further. Who or what body may properly render
judgments about these other matters and, if necessary, enforce them? This
too is a complex question, and I shall only make a few tentative remarks.
Locke's answer was this: "[S]ince the joyning together of several Members into this Church Society . . . is absolutely free and spontaneous, it
necessarily follows, that the Right of making its Laws can belong to none
but the Society it self, or at least (which is the same thing) to those whom
the Society by common consent has authorized thereunto."35 That is the
view that has attracted the favor of most contemporary theorists as well. As
Denise Reaume puts it: "If outsiders intervene in disputes between internal
dissidents and the rest of the group, they are usurping the power to decide
the ultimate membership criteria of the group."36
The Catholic who thinks divorced teachers should not befiredfrom separate
schools, and yet thinks the fired teacher is wrong to bring unjust dismissal
proceedings; the Aboriginal woman who knows at first hand about sex discrimination with her community and yet is against making self-government
subject to the Charter—each demonstrates her faith in the internal capacity
of her community to permit fair and free discussion and deliberation of these
issues. Outsiders may facilitate such discussion where possible, but they
should not interfere to determine the outcome of the debate.37
There is good sense in this view. But there are powerful reasons for avoiding
coercion that have nothing to do with the proper scope of a group's
35. Locke, supra note 4, at 28-29.
36. Reaume, supra note 25, at 138.
37. Id. at 141. Reaume insists, however, that one who is ultimately unable to persuade the
group of her views mustfinallyremain free to exit.
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authority over its members. Coercion is always a blunt instrument, often a
risky and costly one, and it may provoke backlash. Consider arranged
marriages. The availability of divorce (if it exists) does not negate the w r o n g
in a compulsory union between unwilling partners. Nevertheless, there m a y
be independent reasons for not prohibiting or annulling such unions, for
to do that may promote an ethnocentric understanding of the nature o f
marriage; it may violate settled expectations, and it may just be too wasteful
of the limited resources that any community has for securing compliance.
It is one thing to say what rights bear on an issue, another to enforce
them. From the claim that it is wrong to enforce a certain right and in t h a t
way intervene in a group, it does not follow that members of the group have
only a right of exit. Rights ground duties on the part of others, and when
those duties are violated, some response is called for, though it need n o t
always be one of coercive enforcement. It is also possible to demand,
encourage, and entice others to respect rights. So it is, on a number of
grounds, often better to try to facilitate agreed solutions than to impose
some external judgment on them.
Having said that, however, it is sometimes difficult to know how to draw
the line between insiders and outsiders, as the following example suggests.
Before certain amendments to the Canadian Indian Act, Indian husbands
could bring non-Indian wives into their band, but Indian wives could n o t
bring in their non-Indian husbands. In Savmdge Band v. Canada™ three
Indian bands in Alberta sought a declaration that the amendments that
restored band membership to aboriginal women who married out infringed
their aboriginal or treaty right to determine their own membership. The
trial court held that there was no such pre-existing right,39 that if there had
been it was altered by the imposition of British sovereignty and ultimately
extinguished by the 1982 constitution, which, while preserving treaty and
aboriginal rights, also prohibited sex discrimination.40 Is this outside interference? As is often the case, members of the group were themselves
divided. Many native women favored the amendments, as did the Native
Council of Canada; those elders in power in the bands did not. On the
other hand, the whole organization of Indians into bands, and the parlous
circumstances in which Canadian aboriginals often live, are themselves
products of prior outside influence. (Part of the reason the court in Saxvridge
denied that there was a pre-existing right of the sort the bands claimed was
that, in Canadian law, Indian bands are creatures of statute, and what
statute did statute could also undo.) In these circumstances, trying to
38. [1995]4C.N.L.R.121.
39. There was even some evidence that patrilinearity, so far from being an aboriginal
custom, was itself a European imposition: It was the Indian Act and not traditional custom that
excluded women who marry out from status. The court accepted anthropological testimony to
In «M ' m e m b e r s h i P was a good deal more fluid. Id.
4U. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights reAct7l982 (35)U(4T.CtlOn ^ " " g u a r a n t e e d e( * ual t o m a l e a n d f e m ^ persons." Constitution
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determine what counts as internal authority and what counts as external
intervention does not seem very promising. We are left, then, with the
untidy reality of conflicting moral rights, a general but inconclusive presumption against coercion, and no universally applicable doctrine of
authority capable of settling these disputes. We have displaced the simple
answer of group sovereignty subject to a right of exit only to open the issue
up to a complex cluster of unavoidable moral and political judgments.

VI. THE AUTONOMY OF GROUPS

The defense of internal dissidents may give rise to worries about the extent
to which individual autonomy is compatible with the autonomy of social
groups. This is important, for these groups are not irritants in the body
politic—as I have suggested, they are of positive value because they contribute to the well-being of individuals, and also because a system that has a
plurality of different groups is more likely to hit on some successful experiments in living. However, it may now seem that we have done through the
back door what we would not do through the front door. Have we not just
made social groups directly accountable to the familiar set of basic rights,
rights that special groups may not endorse and which may stand in the way
of their distinctive projects? There may be no harm in insisting on a
nondiscriminatory rationing of resources on an Indian reserve, but to insist
on sex equality in fundamentalist Muslim communities may be tantamount
to a change in religion, and to deny Catholic schools the power to fire gay
teachers may be to require that they abandon their sexual morality.
This objection reflects a fear of social homogenization—the concern
that all religions will end up like the Church of England, all cultural
minorities like the Scots, all social groups like the Freemasons, all of whom
accommodated themselves quite well to the rising liberal order around
them, mainly by transformation. This fear, although not baseless, is exaggerated. As we have seen, the rights in question are abstract and capable
of being expressed and respected in many different ways, and whether or
not they should be institutionalized and protected by legal mechanisms
remains an open question. It seems likely that the judiciary will have a
different role and status in different societies depending on their political
culture, history, and especially on what other institutions are capable of
protecting rights. Moreover, as we have seen, there are good reasons for
supporting internal adjudicative mechanisms for such groups, and these
will inevitably steer the internal political culture in directions suited to
their distinctive history, purposes, and character. Freedom of expression in
the Catholic Church will not be expected to match that within a secular
university, though both must find ways to honor the ideal That ZT
room for a lot of moral and cultural diversity, though perham W ! r
g
perhaps less diversity
than some would like.
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Many partisans of minority groups are attracted to the austere combination of exit and tolerance because they imagine that rights of exit are fairly
benign, whereas both the rights of internal minorities and the interference
of outsiders arerisky.They are mistaken about both terms of the comparison. Respecting the other rights is often less risky than they suppose, while
limiting dissent to the right of exit is a good deal more hazardous. As
Hirschman argues, exit tends to drive out voice. In a consumer market,
when the price of a product goes up, the first customers to leave are those
at the margin for whom a slight shift will change their preferences. However, when exit is an option and the quality of a product falls, it is the most
quality-sensitive customers who leave.41 In many cases those are precisely
the customers who, if they were to stay and lobby for change, could have
the most beneficial impact. In the United States the middle classes are t h e
first to exit a decaying public school system, and in Britain they are the first
to leave the collapsing National Health Service. In each case, the net result
is that public institutions become even worse; then they lose their next most
sensitive clients, and so on, until those who are left are simply those who are
stuck.
Exit is always a crude, and mute, response to dissatisfaction—even hotels
and restaurants try to get additional information about why their customers
do, or do not, return. Institutions as complex and significant as churches
or universities are likely to find that approaching their adherents on a "take
it or leave it" basis is equally foolish. Social groups that are organized so as
to rely on exit as the only or main response to dissatisfaction may therefore
end up by threatening the survival of the group: Those most able to adapt
and transform may be the first to leave. (This much we have seen in the
exodus of German intellectuals in the 1930s and of Eastern Europeans after
the war.) Groups thus have an incentive to provide for internal channels for
dissent and to resist the thought that dissidents should simply leave. So far
from guaranteeing group autonomy, an exclusive focus on rights of exit
leaves groups prey to a loss of control and inability to adapt to changing
circumstances.
Still, there is no denying that there are costs to respecting the right of
exit. As we have seen, it is but one of a cluster of rights that serve autonomy
and, whatever we choose to call it, a "real," "meaningful," or "substantive"
right of exit will burden some groups in ways that they would rather avoid.
There is also a cost that arises merely from the availability of a right of exit,
whether or not it is exercised. The modern world has been a maelstrom of
change, but there are other worlds with other values. Certain cultures,
including (some say) the aboriginal peoples of North America and Australasia, appear not to place much value on individual autonomy, perhaps
because in their more stable social environments they did not need it.
41. Hirschman, supra note 9, at 47.
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Writing of the Maori, for example, Richard Mulgan notes how the possibility of leaving has altered post-contact communities:
Once the possibility of leaving with impunity becomes practicable and the
fact of staying becomes a deliberate decision the ethical balance between
individual and group has shifted irrevocably in the individual's direction.
Today loyalty to the group and submersion in its activities and purposes can
never be recovered.42
We need to be cautious in supposing that the burden of choice is a uniquely
modern phenomenon. In every society people make choices about family
and kinship; they make decisions about how to interact with neighboring
clans, and there is often some fluidity to group membership. What is surely
true, however, is that the scope and significance of these choices have
dramatically increased, perhaps nowhere as much as in those pre-industrial
cultures and fundamentalist religions that have persisted into the modern
era. Choice is an intrusion in such groups. Often, the conflict is over the
future of their children, for it is through their children that parents aspire
to ensure the survival of their culture and values. I am not persuaded that
there is, in fact, much value in cultural survival for its own sake—and we
must not lose sight of the fact that the raw materials out of which groups
produce survival are the lives of other people.43 Quite apart from that,
however, the right of exit itself works to make certain kinds of group life
harder to sustain. An unreflective attachment in which interests of the self
and group are not distinguished becomes nearly impossible, and with it at
least some forms of communitarian and identity politics.
Is this ground for regret? Hegel (in some moods) and certain modern
communitarians appear to think so. When life becomes fraught with choice
our attachments may seem no more solid than the shifty human will. It is as
if we have been thrust into a realm of obligatory existentialism. But it is not
the imposition of basic liberties on the internal constitution of groups that
makes that so—it comes with the right of exit itself. Insisted on as the
necessary and sufficient condition for individual autonomy, it proves to be
both less and more than bargained for.

42. Richard Mulgan, MAORI, PAKEHA AND DEMOCRACY 64 (1989), as cited in Kukathas, supra
note 2, at 249.
43. I would want to distinguish between cultural survival, and cultural security. The latter
protects cultures only against unfair pressures to conform to majority practices. See Leslie
Green, Are Language RightsFundamental? 25 OSCOODE HALL L.J. 653-58 (1987).

